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THEORETIC BASES OF LAW*
FRIEDRiC KESSLERt
HE moral and intellectual crisis of our time has not spared the
science of law, jurisprudence. It is becoming increasingly
fashionable among legal philosophers to comment on the short-
comings of the still prevailing creed: legal positivism. An ungrateful gen-
eration is beginning to forget its great achievements. The critics of legal
positivism prophesy its doom because, as they claim, it does not furnish
us with the moral and intellectual weapons which we need to keep our
democratic institutions alive. Some of them see the only salvation in a
return to natural law.
To be sure, the shortcomings of an extreme legal positivism have often
become painfully apparent, but we should equally be aware of the trouble
some of the critics of positivism are inviting. A return to obscurantism of
one sort or another is a real danger in a time like the present.
An exhaustive reexamination of the theoretic bases of law is too large an
order for a short paper. I therefore propose to discuss the topic in terms of
the main philosophies of law which history has produced. The justifica-
tion for such a procedure lies in the fact that the struggle for existence
among the main philosophies of law has helped considerably to clarify
its theoretic bases.
The story of legal philosophy has often been told in terms of the eternal
struggle between natural law and positivism. The believer in natural law,
though admitting that his creed has sometimes been in eclipse, is never-
theless convinced of its ultimate and complete triumph. The positivist
is equally sure that final victory is his; natural law is nothing but meta-
physics which will be abandoned gradually as we reach intellectual ma-
turity.
In terms of this description both natural law philosophy and positivism
have fixed and definite meanings. The former is the belief in an eternal
law which claims validity independent of its concretization in positive
laws. The latter, on the other hand, regards law as the creation of the
ruling power in society in an historical process. Law is only what the ruling
power has commanded; and it is law by virtue of this very circumstance.
* The substance of this paper was delivered as a lecture at a Fiftieth Anniversary Sym-
posium of the University of Chicago, September 24, 1941.
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This description of the contrast, though common, is a onesided over-
simplification. It overplays the difference between the two ways of think-
ing which are in a constant process of adaptation to changing climates of
opinion; a process often concealed behind the use of the same formula
which has altered its meaning. The antitheses which natural law has at-
tempted to resolve have been different during the course of its history: In
antiquity they were nature and statute, in the Middle Ages they were
divine and human law, and in modem times they are common and in-
dividual interest. Natural law theories have often been used to legitimize
the established order, but not less frequently to support claims for political
and social changes.x Positivism similarly has gone through a process of
change: Elements of empiricism, of normativism, and of realism have in
turn predominated. Each way of thinking about law has deeply influ-
enced the other.
NATURAL LAW
All philosophies of natural law-whether it is regarded as a part of
theology or of ethics or as an independent discipline-have one basic be-
lief in common: the belief in the existence of certain fundamental legal
principles and institutions deeply grounded in the general plan of life
and inherent in all ordered social existence. These principles laying down
absolute standards of justice are open to man's cognition. The great nat-
ural law systems have expressed this belief in different formulae. Re-
ligious (scholastic) natural law-the legal philosophy of the church-
teaches that due to God's providence man participates in divine reason
and is thus able to distinguish between good and evil and to grasp the
fundamental principles of natural law. Natural law is the participation of
eternal law in the rational creature (Lex naturalis est participatio legis
aeternae in rationali creatura).2 Reason is the servant of divine providence.
Rationalistic natural law maintains that nature has endowed man with
the faculty of knowing and acting in accordance with the principles of
natural law to enable him to gratify his impelling desire for social life-
"not of any and every sort, but peaceful and organized according to the
measure of his intelligence, with those who are of his kind." The very na-
ture of man is the mother of the law of nature. No one can deny its funda-
mental principles "without doing violence to himself." They are in them-
selves manifest and clear, "almost as evident as are those things which we
I Max Weber, Rechtssoziologie, in 2 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 496 et seq., 3 Grundriss
der Sozialoekonomik (2d ed. 1925); Neumann, Types of Natural Law, 8 Studies in Philosophy
and Social Science 338 et seq. (194o).
2Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. la, 2ae q. 91, a. 2.
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perceive by the natural senses."3 Under this system reason implicitly has
the function of governing man's desires and of enabling him to forsake the
satisfaction of individual desires for the good of society. Idealistic philoso-
phy of natural law from Plato to Fries and Nelson anchors natural law in
the idea of the' Good (practical reason, the .Rechtsidee) as the ultimate
source of self-evident, necessary maxims of conduct.
The natural law philosopher, if he does not live in the clouds, experi-
ences the existence of positive laws (constitutions, statutes, and court de-
cisions), and it is their existence which confronts him with the question of
the relation between natural and positive law.
The solutions of this problem have changed considerably in the course
of the history of natural law philosophy. The early Greek philosophers of
natural law had no difficulty in finding an answer on the basis of their
pantheistic philosophy. They assumed a unity of the whole legal uni-
verse, regarding the legal system and institutions of the various states
either as gifts of the gods or as a product of a divine world plan. The hap-
py illusion could not last forever. Cool observation forced later genera-
tions of Greek philosophers of natural law to differentiate between natural
and positive law. Stoic philosophy, because of its belief in a well ordered
Cosmos, attempted to revive the original idea of natural law. Still the
Stoics had to admit that human laws and institutions are but imperfect
and incomplete realizations of the law of Nature. The idea of a dual order
has formed the basis of most natural law speculation ever since.
But does not its acceptance practically amount to a betrayal of the
great idea that the principles of natural law are universal and immutable?
Does not natural law preserve its majesty only by being removed to the
clouds while positive laws maintain their independence and are enforced
and complied with even if they are unjust? If natural lawis a body of self-
evident truths, does not its existence dispose of the need for positive laws?
In view of these difficulties the temptation to abandon the dualism of nat-
ural and positive law was very great indeed. Some philosophers of natural
law came pretty close to abandoning the dual system in favor of positive
law by maintaining that positive law is needed for the concretization of
the necessarily general principles of natural law. The temptation of
abandoning the dualism in favor of natural law was equally great for those
natural law philosophers who did not confrne the codex of natural law to
a few general principles but could not resist working out a whole system
of minute natural law rules. Yet natural law philosophy on the whole was
realistic enough not to forsake the theory of a dual order.
3 Grotius, De Jure Pacis ac Bell, proleg. §§ 6, 7, i6, 39.
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The constant awareness of this dualism already mirrored in the contrast
between Plato's Republic and Laws explains why natural law philosophy,
despite its tendency to idealize, did not neglect the living law with its
institutions and did respond to changing climates of opinion. The Tho-
mistic-Aristotelian system of natural law of the Middle Ages incorporated
feudalism with its political, social, and economic philosophy. 4 The nat-
ural law system created by the Enlightenment reflected the decay of
feudalism; it became the political theology of a bourgeois society which
had replaced the former order.
The dualistic theory of law fitted in with the Christian dogma of the
Fall of Man and was, therefore, made part of the Christian system of nat-
ural law. Scholastic philosophy striving at a synthesis of our Greek
heritage and Christian dogma elaborated the dual system of the Greeks
into the Church's grandiose scheme of a hierarchical structure of four legal
orders: lex humana positiva, lex naturalis, lex divina, lex aeterna. Scholasti-
cism culminated in Thomism, whose theory of the interrelationship be-
tween lex naturalis and lex humana is a great advance on the doctrine of
earlier Christian philosophers. Reaching a deeper understanding of the
theocratic idea than ever before, emphasizing the principle of the common
good, and reinterpreting natural law philosophy, Thomism succeeded in
constructing a uniform social philosophy, an achievement which early
Christian philosophers had been unable to accomplish because they re-
garded the state and human laws merely as poena et remediur peccati.
This reinterpretation of natural law led to a new conception of the law of
nature, in which, in the words of Troeltsch, "the difference between the
absolute Primitive State and the relative state of fallen human nature be-
comes less important, and in which the more positive emphasis is laid on
aspects of healing and progress towards a higher ideal, than on the nega-
tive aspects of destruction and punishment."' This transformation of
4 i Troeltscb, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches 201 et seq., 280 et seq. (193 1);
Figgis, Studies in Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius 12 (1931).
5 Troeltsch, op. cit. supra note 4, at 282, 283. "Whether the Fall had taken place or not,
human beings would still have created social institutions, only this process would have been
carried out in the spirit of love and voluntary submission and control, without the resistance
of the senses to reason, and therefore without pain and without suffering. But, apart from the
fact that their basic ideas would have been different, in reality the institutions which they
created would still have appeared very similar to those which have actually come into being.
The Law of Nature, therefore, is no longer identical with the Christian Law of Grace and the
Golden Age of the Stoics; it is only the natural preparation for, and preparatory form of, the
mystical community of grace, which is understood in the sense of the Aristotelian doctrine of
evolution, as the working out of the impulse of reason in natural terms." Consult Lottin,
Le Droit Naturel chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses Prdcesseurs (2d ed. 1931); de Lagarde,
Recherches sur l'Esprit Politique de la RMforme (1926).
1I
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natural law philosophy enabled Christianity to bridge the gulf between
Christian and secular ethics. Still Christian natural law (from St. Thomas
to Luther) was unable to overcome completely the dogma of the Fall. As a
result it did not object to positive laws even if they stabilized social in-
equality. Liberty, equality, and community of property, it is true, are
Christian ideas but they cannot be maintained because of man's sinful
nature.
That such an attitude tended to strengthen the authority of secular
powers hardly needs elaboration. 6 But already in the Middle Ages the
theocratic idea began its gradual decline and a new philosophy of the state
emerged, influenced by the political reality of the Holy Roman Empire
and theories of antiquity. It put less emphasis on the divine foundation of
the state than on its origin in natural impulses of man. Consequently, the
authority of the ruler was anchored in the general will of the ruled, the
divine will was regarded only as the causa remota of secular governments."
This idea became of ever-increasing importance as the belief in man's sin-
ful nature lost its convincing appeal.
A new, secular type of natural law philosophy emerged. Its ideas suc-
ceeded in overcoming not only the theocratic ideology, temporarily re-
vived by the Reformation, but also an even more powerful new political
theology which had arisen, the theory of the Leviathan State. In its
struggle against these two adversaries natural law theory of Enlighten-
ment developed its own philosophy of the nature and source of law. The
source of law is not to be found outside man's reason, in a revelation of
a divine will or in the command of a sovereign, but rather within man's
reason. 8 Reason, to be sure, is no longer the servant (famula et ministra)
of divine providence, but despite its emancipation remains the instru-
ment which enables man to develop absolute standards of justice. This
optimism enabled some of the greatest thinkers of the period to deny that
6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. ia, 2ae q. 96 a. 4. But see ibid., at q. go a. 4; McIlwain,
The Growth of Political Thought in the West 153, 326, 364 (1932).
7 Gierke, The Development of Political Theory x71 et seq. (1939) (translation by Freyd
of Gierke, Johannes Althusius).
9 Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklarung 313 et seq. (1932).
It would be an error to assume that the belief in a higher law has prevented the natural
law philosophers of Enlightenment from having a realistic insight into legal problems. This
is beautifully illustrated by the working technique of Grotius, the founder of international law.
Legal concepts are to him closely tied up with life situations and institutions; they are not the
mere result of abstract thinking. The attitude of natural law philosophy towards customary
law also testifies to its realism. Though condemning the consuetudo irrationablis, natural law
theory regards customary law as the product of the collective reason of society-an idea later
elaborated by the historical school of law which propounds a positivistic theory of law.
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compulsion is an essential element of the concept of law, thus reviving
the profound idea of the Middle Ages that the source of law is not an actus
voluntatis but rather an actus intellectus. The state is not above the law
but only its instrument: princeps legibus tenetur. Law from this point of
view, natural as well as positive, is a modus of man's rational nature.
Consequently, the mere empirical fact that the commands of a sovereign
are complied with does not make those commands law. To be law, they
have to be based on the consent of the ruled, or, as we would say today,
anchored in the sense of justice of the community. Law is not a command
but a contract.
Natural law philosophy of the Enlightenment did not stop here. It was
not satisfied with a study of laws in their historical growth, products of
temporary convenience; its emphasis was on law "as it is born with us,"
the source of Humanity itself. 9 In working out this point of view the great
philosophers of natural law in true humanistic spirit rediscovered Plato's
philosophy of law with its profound belief in the interrelationship of logic
and ethics. The influence of Plato's philosophy is reflected in those the-
ories of law which compare law with mathematics and claim that the prin-
ciples of law are as self-evident as mathematical axioms. This analogy-
quaint as it sounds-expresses the belief that law and mathematics have
one feature in common: they testify to the "autonomy and creative spon-
taneity" of the human mind. The human mind is able not only to develop
the realm of mathematics out of "innate ideas" but also to penetrate to the
idea of law. Thus the search for the law of nature had turned into a quest
for the nature of law. In establishing this connection with Plato's philoso-
phy the rationalism of natural law philosophy of the Enlightenment
changed into an idealistic philosophy, an idealism which has been pre-
served in the philosophies of Fries, Gierke, and Nelson. °
This idealism tempted natural law philosophers to develop the optimis-
tic idea of a gradual approximation of the two orders of law. The postu-
lates of natural law have a tendency to become positive, and positive laws
have the same tendency to adapt themselves to the postulates of natural
justice. This was not mere theoretical speculation. The tremendous in-
fluence of the natural law philosophy of the Enlightenment is noticeable
in all fields of law. It gave a new and revolutionary meaning to the famous
9 See Cassirer, op. cit. supra note 8, at 313 et seq., on whose book the following paragraph is
largely based.
lo Fries, Philosophische Rechtslehre (18o3); Nelson, Die Rechtsmissenschaft ohne Recht
(x17); Nelson, System der philosopbischen Rechtslehre und Politik, 3 Vorlesungen Uiber die
Grundlagen der Etbik (1923); Gierke, z Deutsches Privatrecht I20 et seq. (1895).
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phrase Jus positivum adjus naturale reducitur. It has lent legitimation to
the right of resistance against those positive laws which violate the funda-
mental principles of justice and to the proud theory of inalienable rights,
so important in American constitutional law. The theory of the social
contract "was used to turn vague generalizations about the natural free-
dom and equality of man into concrete political demands against govern-
ments,""' thus deeply affecting the political theory of Western Europe.
Natural law philosophy influenced economic theory, supporting the belief
that man in serving his own interest is serving the interest of the com-
munity. It shaped the doctrines of international law, formed the basis of
the great codification movements of the eighteenth century in continental
Europe, and inspired many a reform in the field of criminal law.
With these great achievements, the vitality of natural law theory be-
came gradually exhausted. The development of the French Revolution
discredited it on the continent. Political and economic reality made it in-
creasingly difficult to uphold the optimistic belief in the sanctity of nat-
ural rights and in the philosophy of laissez faire. The theory of secularized
natural law was blamed for justifying "all the dangerous tendencies that
aim to subordinate the state to the antagonistic interests of individualist
society.' 2 The progress of natural science on the basis of a positivistic
attitude completed the undermining of the belief in natural law. No won-
der that natural law theory was almost dead except for its survival in the
legal theory of the Church.
But today a renaissance of natural law is under way. 3 Once more it
begins to permeate political and legal theory. Positivism is on retreat.
A skeptic, though greatly impressed by the vitality, the achievements,
and the ethos of the philosophy of natural law, will still not be convinced
of the eternal validity of its creed. This thesis, that there are absolute
standards of justice open to man's cognition, the skeptic will claim, is only
valid for him who believes in natural law and in a metaphysical concep-
tion of man. To fortify his argument he will point out that most natural
law philosophers have been very careful to limit the codex of natural law
to a few very general principles and that all efforts to work out detailed
natural law rules have ended in disagreement and failure. The insistence
11 Jones, Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law i o (1940).
12 Marcuse, Reason and Revolution 6o (1941); Hegel, Uber die wissenschaftlichen Behand-
lungsarten des Naturrechts, 7 Hegels Gesammelte Werke 329 et seq. (Lasson ed. i913).
. X3 For the development in this country, consult Wright, American Interpretations of Natu-
ral Law (1931); Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1930); Fuller, The Law in
Quest of Itself (xg4o),
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on the indispensability of positive law will nourish his suspicion, and so
will the teachings of modern philosophers of natural law, who insist that
meditation and education are necessary to unearth the rich treasure of
self-evident maxims of conduct hidden in all of us. X4 The skeptic will con-
clude that agreement on what is just-if it ever existed-does not prove
the self-evident character of natural law principles but has been the work
of other forces and institutions, for instance, the Church, a common
religious conviction, a common culture and tradition. A broad belief in
natural law presupposes, according to the skeptic, the background of a
harmonious and well integrated culture and a considerable degree of social
conformity (conservative natural law) or the enthusiasm of a revolution-
ary movement (revolutionary natural law).
These arguments will tempt our skeptic to praise the straightforward-
ness of a philosophy of legal positivism.
POSITIVISM
Positivism has a genealogy almost as noble as natural law philosophy.
It is the necessary and indispensable opponent of natural law theory.
Positivism finds support in the patristic literature. Tertullian voiced the
positivistic creed when he said: "It is our duty to obey a demand of God
not because it is just but because it has been issued by God." The nomi-
nalists among the great Schoolmen (Occam, Gerson, D'Aily) who regarded
natural law not as a lex indicativa but as a lex praescriptivas were posi-
tivists in a sense. So was Calvin when he claimed that God is lege solutus,
ipse sibi lex. Modern positivism, traditionally dated back to Hobbes, de-
nies the existence of an eternal legal order based on right reason:
In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from other
concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quar-
rels, and breach of peace; it was necessary there should be a common measure of all
things that might fall in controversy; as for example: of what is to be called right,
14 Rousseau, Discours sur l'In6galit6. "He (the Natural Law Philosopher) begins by casting
about for the rules which, in their own interest, it would be well for man to agree upon; and
then, without any further proof than the supposed advantage thus resulting, he proceeds to
dignify this body of rules by the name of Natural Law. All the philosophers of his school have
followed the same method. The result is that all the definitions of these learned men, in stand-
ing contradiction with each other, agree in this conclusion only: that it is impossible to under-
stand, impossible therefore to obey, the law of nature without being a deep reasoner and a very
great metaphysician. And that is only another way of saying that, for the establishment of
society, man must have made use of the wisdom which is, in fact, only gradually acquired by a
small minority of men and that with the utmost difficulty, in the bosom of society itself."
(Quoted by Neumann, op. cit. supra note i, at 340 n. i.)
IS Gierke, op. cit. supra note 8, at 88 n. 44.
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what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum and huum, what a pound,
what a quart, &c. For in these things private judgments may differ, and beget con-
troversy. This common measure, some say, is right reason: with whom I should con-
sent, if there were any such thing to be found or known in reru on natura. But com-
monly they that call for right reason to decide any controversy, do mean their own.
But this is certain, seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man, or men,
must supply the place thereof; and that man, or men, is he or they, that have the
sovereign power.'
6
Positive law is the only legal order. The idea, however, that positive
law does not need legitimation by a higher principle developed only gradu-
ally. Even Hobbes, to whom we owe the famous motto of all positivism,
"Auctoritas non veritasfacit legem," was still greatly influenced by natural
law theories.' 7 He anchored, for instance, the authority of the sovereign
in an implied contract of submission. For later positivists, positive law no
longer needs legitimation by the social contract. It is its own beginning.
This basic philosophy explains the attitude of many positivists who are
inclined to treat the binding force of law as a problem of mass psychology
or to dismiss as metalegal the question as to the ultimate source of law.
It would be an error to assume that justice has no place in a positivistic
philosophy of law or that for the positivist justice is nothing else than the
interest of the stronger, as Thrasymachus claimed. On the contrary the
justice of positive law according to Hobbes lies in the fact that it has
abolished chaos and anarchy prevailing among men before its promulga-
tion. Positive law is just because it has created peace and order and
brought to an end the bellum omnium contra omnes. Consequently the fact
that a law has been passed is more important than its contents. This
statement made sometimes by positivists ceases to be shocking if we bear
the basic belief of positivism in mind. Positivism has undergone many
changes. The belief in the virtues of absolutism has given way to a belief
in the nomos basileus, a government of law and not of man. But its funda-
mental tenet that the justice of law lies in the security it gives to the indi-
vidual has remained unchanged. The principal objective of the law is "the
z6 Hobbes, Elements of Law, Part II, c. 1o, § 8 (Tdnnies ed. 1928).
X7 Hobbes, Leviathan c. 26, p. 133 (Latin ed. 1678). The corresponding passage in the Eng-
lish edition (1651), at p. 143, is not equally unequivocal. The statement, "It is not wisdom,
but authority that makes a law," can, however, be found in Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a Phi-
losopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (168z), in 6 Hobbes, English Works
5 (Molesworth ed. i84o). Note that Hobbes, far more careful than his successors, spoke of "a"
law, not of "the" law. On Hobbes consult Dilthey, Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen
seit Renaissance nd Reformation, 2 Gesammelte Schriften 360 et seq. (3d ed. 1923); Cassirer,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 339 et seq.; Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936).
THEORETIC BASES OF LAW
care of security."" 'We obey the law not necessarily because we think
that the law is right, but we think it right to obey the law."' 9 As a matter
of fact the predictability of decisions (formal rationality of the law) was
raised to the dignity of an ethical value and became increasingly popular
during the nineteenth century with the development of the liberal com-
petitive phase of capitalistic expansion.20 Nineteenth century positivism
never tired of emphasizing the duty of all those in charge of administering
the law not to disappoint the "expectation" (Bentham) of citizens who
have acted in reliance on the letter of statutes or the binding force of
precedents. To avoid arbitrary interpretation and the sneaking in of per-
sonal predilections, statutes should be expressed as dearly as possible,
and, as Bentham suggested, case law replaced by codification. Law be-
came a command of the state. Bentham in his fanaticism, and the whole
school of analytical jurisprudence, really strove to make the legal system
as reliable as a timetable. The fetish of legal certainty and the fear of
the subjectivity of notions of justice account for the attempt of many
positivists to work out a pure theory oflaw, to separate rigidly the "is"
and the "ought," and to treat all economic, political, and ethical consider-
ations bearing upon legal institutions as metalegal."
There can be no doubt that positivism has made a great contribution to
philosophy of law. Its critique of natural law has often been healthy and
frequently has forced natural law philosophy to abandon theories or to
improve upon them. Its emphasis on the security function of law shows
real insight. Most of all, positivism deserves credit for the great improve-
ment of our system of legal concepts. Positivists, instead of spending their
intellectual energies in endless speculation about the nature of law and its
ultimate basis, catalogued and classified decisions, chiseled out concepts,
and improved upon the tools of the legal trade.
But, the natural law philosopher will insist, the shortcomings of posi-
tivism should not be overlooked either. Positivism does not furnish us
with a criterion which enables us to differentiate between a rule of law and
18 Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, i Works 297, 307, 311, 322 et seq. (Bowring's ed.
1843).
'9 MacIver, The Modem State 54 (1926).
o Mannheim, Man and Society i8o (194o); as to formal and material rationality, consult
Max Weber, op. cit. supra note i, at 468 et seq.
21 Kesen, The Function of the Pure Theory of Law, in Law a Century of Progress 23!
, '
241
(1937). On Kelsen's theory of law, see Lauterpacht, Kelsen's Pure Science of Law, in Modem
Theories of Law 1o5 et seq. (1933); Wilson, The Basis of Kelsen's Theory of Law, x Politica 54
(x934); for a more general discussion consult Brecht, The Myth of Is and Ought, 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 811 (1941).
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the arbitrary command of a despot, a distinction of great moment today.
It is superficial normativism since its only criterion of a rule of law is
promulgation by the proper authority and actual compliance. Whether a
rule is complied with because of fear or because it is the expression of the
sense of justice of the community is irrelevant. Experience, a critic of
positivism will continue, "can only tell what has been enforced, or obeyed,
or laid down as law, and not what gives rules and institutions their spe-
cifically legal character. '22 Nor can legal history be resorted to in order to
explain the mysterious nature of law; the legal historian in selecting his
material uses an a priori concept of law and it is this concept which
positivism cannot explain. The positivist will not be greatly impressed
by this line of reasoning. Can you deny-he will ask his opponent-that
even your system cannot prevent unjust rules which are actually en-
forced, and that the right of resistance is quite often a rather empty right?
Are you not merely quibbling when you refuse to call an unjust command
a rule of law as long as you have to admit that it will'be enforced? Still the
natural law philosopher will not admit defeat. He will remind the posi-
tivist of the sad fact that the ideal of legal certainty cannot be realized
under positivism; it is a mere ideology just as is natural justice. The har-
mony of the legal system enjoyed during part of the nineteenth century
was not the result of the victory of positivism but rather of an unparal-
leled stability of the economic system. The expectation of citizens will
always be disappointed since statutes as a practical matter are subject to
different interpretations and cannot possibly take care of all contingencies.
The rule of stare decisis has to remain flexible. To illustrate his point the
natural law philosopher will refer to the efforts of positivists like Langdell
and his school who tried in vain to build up a harmonious body of case
law on a conceptualistic basis. They had the rather naive belief that case
law could be reduced to a relatively small number of "fundamental" legal
rules and that decisions could be called correct or false in terms of legal con-
cepts.2 3 They seldom admitted that many a legal rule has an exception or
a counter-rule and that the middle terms used in the lawyers' syllogism
are of necessity "weasel" words. A court, therefore, in rendering a deci-
sion cannot act like a robot but has to make a choice on the basis of what
it regards a just result. It is no wonder, the natural law philosopher will
notice rather gleefully, that this brand of positivism has given way to
legal realism.
22 Jones, op. cit. supra note ii, at 210, 211.
'3 Langdell, Cases on Contracts, Preface (1871). "Law is a science, and all the available
materials of that science are contained in printed books." 3 L. Q. Rev. 123, 124 (1887).
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LEGAL REALISM
American legal realism in its early phase was an extreme form of legal
positivism. Its theory of law was an expression of its struggle against the
conceptualism of analytical jurisprudence. Realism introduced a sharp
distinction between what courts say and what they actually do.2 4 Only
the latter counts. This attitude found its classic expression in Holmes'
famous definition of law as "the prophecies of what courts will do in fact."
Law became the behavior pattern of judges and similar officials. For-
tunately legal realism did not stop at this kind of empiricism. It developed
and perfected the functional approach.25 Decisions were no longer praised
or criticized because of their neat or incorrect manipulation of abstract
theories and concepts. Realists focused their attention on whether a deci-
sion had given due weight to considerations of public policy. These con-
siderations-realists assert-are closely tied up with the economic, social,
and cultural function of legal institutions and with the ideals of justice of
society. 6 It is only a natural consequence of this point of view that a rigid
separation of the "is" and the "ought" is regarded as impossible. Realists
only protest against the application of "ossified ethics," but they are all
eager to "improve the judicial system, to make it more efficient, more
responsive to social needs, more 'just' if you like that word. 127
24 For a bibliography on legal realism and its critics consult Garlan, Legal Realism and jus-
tice 135 et seq. (194'); see further Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (i94o); McDougal,
Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 Yale L. J. 827 (i941).
25 F. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, i Modem L. Rev. 5 (1937).
26 This insight has never been more trenchantly formulated than in the famous passage of
Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897), in Collected Legal Papers x8i, x84 (1920):
"The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method
and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But
certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies
a judgme4t as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the
whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a con-
dition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice
of the community, or of a class, or because of some opinion as to the policy, or, in short, be-
cause of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement,
and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions .....
"I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of
weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often
proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground
and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious, as I have said ..... I can-
not but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more definitely
and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, they
sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and see that they were taking sides
upon debatable and often burning questions."
27 Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Eucidian Legal Thinking, 17 Corn. L. Q. 568, 586
(1932).
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Legal realism thus became an institutional approach, a natural develop-
ment in view of the paramount importance of problems of constitutional
law in this country. The institutional approach is the technique par excel-
lence of the public lawyer.28 .The shortcomings of a conceptualistic kind of
positivism may not always be painfully apparent in technical issues of
purely private law but the working technique of the conceptualist leaves
the lawyer quite helpless in all legal problems involving public law. The
institutional method will gain in influence as public law predominates
over private law and public control of business supersedes laissez faire.
The modern legal realist thinks of law no longer in terms of a behavior
pattern of judges but in terms of legal institutions which are part of a
cultural system. Each legal institution is serving a purpose and has its
place in a given culture. It cannot be fully understood as an item in itself
but only in its function in the whole structure. Law, if we carry the theory
of the realists further, is a teleological system rooted in the sense of justice
of the members of the community and influencing their sense of justice in
turn. Unlike science and art it is a social phenomenon "in which a cultural
system and its external organization are still united." Consequently each
legal concept including the concept "law" shows of necessity the marks of
the external organization of the society in which it came to life.9 Even
the concept "law" (for instance its relation to ethics, to custom) changes'
with the various cultural systems and their development. All efforts,
therefore, to develop a general and universal concept of law covering all
legal systems and every legal system in all phases of its development must
necessarily fail. The belief in an a priori concept of law is bad philosophy.
Justice also is no longer a system of universal and unchangeable standards
of value. The notions as to what is just vary with the different systems of
culture and with its institutions past and present. An unchanging justice
in a changing world does not exist. "The Platonic ideal of justice," in the
words of Tillich, "was the concrete harmony of the city-state, .... in
medieval feudalism [justice was] the forms of mutual responsibility of all
degrees of the hierarchy to each other, in liberalism the laws abolishing
formal privileges and introducing legal equality.' '30
Legal realism thus interpreted enables us to arrive at a better under-
standing of the contribution natural law philosophy and positivism have
made to the theory of law. The eternal struggle between the two ways of
2s Jennings, The Institutional Theory, in Modem Theories of Law 68 (1933).
29 Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften 54 et seq. (2d ed. 1923).
30 Tillich, Ethics in a Changing World, in Religion and the Modem World Si, 61 (Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Bicentennial Conference, 194i).
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thinking brings out dearly that the relation between law and justice is the
central problem of all speculation about law. Each philosophy of law has
deeply influenced the other. Positivism has prevented natural law from
engaging solely in lofty speculation. The influence of natural law tradition
even at times when natural law was in eclipse was so strong as to make it
impossible for positivism to deteriorate into an apology for the might-
makes-right principle or to become superficial empiricism. It is, therefore,
not surprising that in general the representatives of natural law as well as
positivism have been quite anxious to leave a window open to the other
mode of thinking. Natural law theory as we have seen has certain posi-
tivistic aspects, while not all positivism is free from elements which are
the product of natural law theories.
The realist does not share the point of view of the positivist that natural
law is only a collection of purely subjective ideals of'justice, morals mas-
querading as law, while positivism is an objective theory. From the real-
ist's point of view positivism uses only a different mythology than natural
law theory, but a mythology it is nevertheless. The positivism of the
school of analytical jurisprudence is based on the magical belief that the
correct application of logic makes for a legal system endowed with the
quality of completeness and freedom from contradictions. The pure the-
ory of law uses a mathematical mythology. The positivism of the great
Hobbes is even founded on a natural-law basis. To be sure, the idea of a
higher law is an ideology from the point of view of the realist. But can it
be dispensed with? Does it not express deep-rooted human needs and high
human aspirations? Is not the belief in natural law and the fact that the
idea of a natural law lives in the real attitudes and actions of men of
tremendous importance for the preservation of our moral tradition and for
the survival of our culture? Natural law philosophy has shown profound
insight into human nature and into the interrelationship of law and ethics.
The theory of the dual structure of the legal system is an effort to recon-
cile idea and reality, our external experience according to which all law is
positive law and our inner experience which tellsus that all law derives its
vitality and strength from the idea of justice born with us. Despite all
deviations from notions of justice we are convinced that only just laws are
worth preserving and unjust laws have to be changed. The idea of justice
is immanent in the concept of law."'
This attitude enables the realist to achieve a synthesis of natural law
philosophy and positivism. He can make use of the contribution of both.
31 Gierke, Johannes Althusius 366 (4th ed. 1929); 1 Gierke, Deutsches Priatrecht x2o
(1895).
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Though not sharing the belief of the natural law philosopher in a dual
structure of law the legal realist believes with the former in the intimate
connection between law and notions of justice, a connection which is re-
flected in almost any language., It is no accident that the judge is called
"justice" and thatjus and justitia, Recht and Gerechtigkeit, have the same
etymological root. It is in the sense of justice of the community, the ulti-
mate basis of law, that law and justice flow together. "Ethical views as
to what is fair and just are, and always have been, streaming into the law
through all human agencies that are connected with it, judges and jurists
as well as legislatures and public opinion. ' ' 32 Possibly the founder of mod-
ern positivism already had this insight when he based the authority of his
sovereign on a social contract and emphasized the security function of
law. The same can be said with more confidence for the pure theory of
law. It is true, the pure theory of law anchors all positive law in a basic
legal norm, but this basic norm is so flexible as to take account of the
sense of justice of the community.
All law has the task of reconciling the ideal of certainty with the need
for flexibility. Only the idea of law remains permanent. Its actual con-
cretization is in an eternal process of adaptation to changing social needs.
The revival of the idea of natural law in our present crisis shows that the
principle of the common good inherent in the moral tradition of Western
Civilization has not exhausted its vitality and is still guiding our sense of
justice. It will enable us to keep democracy alive by adapting our in-
herited institutions through the democratic process to the practical and
psychological realities of our time. "Democracy," in the words of Taw-
ney, "is a kingdom to be won, not a possession to be enjoyed."
32 M. Cohen, Jus Naturale Redivivus, 25 Philosophical'Rev. 761, 766 (igi6).
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